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Abstract: It is the purpose of the present paper to compare Emil Lederer and Joseph Schumpeter with 
respect to their visions concerning the notions of economic growth, technology, credit and business cycles. 
Lederer,  just  like  Schumpeter,  used  the  distinction  between statics  and  dynamics.  Also,  according  to 
Lederer, technical progress leads to economic growth and is necessarily linked to fluctuations, an insight 
that we have already encountered in Schumpeter. They both emphasized the role of credit expansion and 
linked it  with innovation. The endogenous character of economic fluctuations is another common point 
between the two great theoreticians. Moreover, the roots of some of Schumpeter’s and Lederer’s common 
views are traced back to Rudolf Hilferding and Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-Baranowsky. Our analysis shows 
that despite the fact that the two economists are traditionally classified in different schools of thought, their 
theoretical investigations in a great number of thematic areas seem to converge to similar views since they 
developed certain of their theories in the same social, political, theoretical and ideological environment and 
were well acquainted with each other’s ideas. We may conclude, therefore, that the similarities of certain 
Schumpeterian  elaborations  with  theoretical  theses  and  analyses  delivered  by  Emil  Lederer  are  not 
accidental, but the outcome of this long interaction between them and other leading economists of that 
period like Rudolf Hilferding and Tugan-Baranowsky.
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1. Introduction
Undoubtedly,  Joseph  Alois  Schumpeter  “was  one  of  the  greatest  economists  of  all  time” 
(Haberler  1950,  p.  1)  who made seminal  contributions  to  economics.  Scitovski  (1980,  p.  1) 
placed  him at  the  top  of  economic  thought.  Kessler  (1961,  p.  334)  argued  that,  apart  from 
Keynes,  Schumpeter  was  “the  only  truly  great  economist”  of  the  20th century.  Morgenstern 
(1951, p. 203) claimed that he “belongs to that small top group where further ranking becomes 
almost impossible”. Chandler (1962, p. 284) regarded Schumpeter as the economist with the best 
understanding of  the  role  of  innovation  and entrepreneurship.  Also,  the  works of  Rosenberg 
(1982), Lazonick (1990), Scherer (1984) and Porter (1985) are influenced by the Schumpeterian 
doctrine. 
However, some important aspects of Schumpeter’s works remain less widely discussed. 
Given the presence of central  elements of Schumpeter’s works in the analyses of other great 
theoreticians,  it  is  surprising  that  so  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  them.  For  instance, 
Schumpeter’s  affinities  with  other  great  theoreticians  such  as  Emil  Lederer  or  Schools  of 
economic thought,  such  as  the  German Historical  School,  have been unexplored.  This  paper 
focuses  on  Schumpeter’s  affinities  with  Emil  Lederer,  “the  leading  academic  socialist  of 
Germany in the 1920’s” (Schumpeter 1954, p. 884), while two companion pieces look in detail at 
Schumpeter’s  affinities with the prominent Marxist theorist Rudolf Hilferding  and the  German 
Historical School, respectively (Michaelides and Milios 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). 
There are two main reasons why studying the potential relationship between them is of 
great  interest.  First,  because  Schumpeter  ranks  among  the  “most  important  and  enduringly 
influential  economists  of  all  time”  (Hodgson,  2007,  p.  2)  and  had  a  major  impact  on  the 
development  of  economics.  Second,  it  is  an  important  key  for  understanding  his  economic 
writings.  Obviously,  understanding  the  origins  of  these  important  ideas  in  economics  helps 
clarifying  the  contrasts  between  orthodox  economics  and  the  heterodox  approaches. In  this 
framework, this essay focuses on the conceptual relationship between Joseph Schumpeter and 
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Emil Lederer. Moreover, the roots of some of Schumpeter’s and Lederer’s common views are 
traced back to Rudolf Hilferding and Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-Baranowsky.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 offers a brief biographical presentation of 
the  two  economists’  life  and  work;  section  3  explores  their  respective  theses  on  economic 
change; section 4 investigates the role of technology in their writings, section 5 analyzes the role 
of  credit;  section  6  presents  their  views  on  economic  fluctuations;  section  7  discusses  the 
influence  of  Rudolf  Hilferding  and  Tugan-Baranowsky on  some of  Lederer’s  views;  finally, 
section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Brief Biographical Notes
2.1 Joseph Schumpeter 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), the son of a cloth manufacturer, was born in Triesch in 
the  Austrian  part  of  Moravia,  in  what  was  then  the  Hapsburg  Empire  and  died  in  Taconic, 
Connecticut. In 1901 Schumpeter enrolled in the faculty of law at the University of Vienna, and 
continued his studies in Berlin and London.  He studied economic theory under Friedrich von 
Wieser, Eugen von Philippovich and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. In 1905 he took part in Böhm-
Bawerk’s seminar, where the latter’s criticism of Marx was one of the topics of debate. A year 
later,  in  1906,  he  took  the  degree  Doctor  utriusque  iuris. In  1909,  thanks  to  Böhm-Bawerk 
(Kirsch  1979,  p.  143),  Schumpeter  became  an  Assistant  Professor  at  the  University  of 
Czernowitz. Between 1911 and 1919 he taught Political Economy as a Full Professor in Graz, 
while  in  1913 and in  1914 he was an Exchange Professor  at  Columbia  University.  In 1918, 
Schumpeter  became  member  of  the  German  Socialisation  Commission 
(Sozialisierungskommission), and in  1919  he  was  appointed  Minister  of  Finance  in  the  new 
government  formed  by  the  Social  Democrats  (Haberler  1950,  p.  346).  In  1921  he  became 
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president of a highly respected private banking house (Biederman Bank) in Vienna, and when the 
bank collapsed in 1924 after the great inflation in Germany, he returned to the academic world 
and in 1925 accepted a professorship at the University of Bonn in Germany. From 1932 until his 
death he taught at Harvard University, and he served as president of the American Economic 
Association,  the  first  foreign-born economist  to  attain  this  distinction.  Schumpeter’s  writings 
cover a broad range of topics including the dynamics of economic development, the feasibility of 
capitalism and the history of economic analysis.  
2.2 Emil Lederer
Emil Lederer was born in Pilsen (Bohemia) in 1882 to a merchant family.  He studied law and 
economics at the University of Vienna from 1901 on and took his doctoral degree in law in 1905. 
Among  others,  his  professors  were  Carl  Menger,  Friedrich  von  Wieser,  Eugen  von  Böhm-
Bawerk and Eugen von Philippovich, while Ludwig von Mises, Otto Bauer, Joseph Schumpeter 
and Rudolf Hilferding were among his friends (or  classmates).  Although educated at Vienna, 
Lederer is not regarded as a member of the Austrian School. Lederer could be considered as one 
of  the  last  members  of  the  “Austro-Marxists”. In 1905,  Lederer  was promoted to  Dr. iur. in 
Vienna, and in 1911 Dr. rer. pol. at Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich. The next year, 
he habilitated at Ruprecht Karl University of Heidelberg. In 1918, he was appointed Assistant 
Professor at Heidelberg University, but remained in Austria until  1920.  Lederer was active in 
Social Democratic circles in Austria and Germany.  In 1919, he was appointed member of the 
German Socialisation Committee, along with Hilferding and  his old Vienna classmate, Joseph 
Schumpeter.  At Heidelberg University, Lederer  became full  professor in 1920. From 1923 to 
1925 he held  lectures  as  guest  professor  at  Tokyo Imperial  University.  From 1923 to  1931, 
Lederer and Alfred Weber were directors of the Institute for Social and State Sciences. In 1931, 
he  succeeded  Werner  Sombart  at  the  German Faculty  for  National  Economy and Financial  
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Sciences at  Humboldt  University  of  Berlin.  As all  “Heidelberger  economists”,  in  April  1933 
Lederer was suspended by the Nazis.1 In addition, university members had denunciated Lederer 
for  being a member of the Social  Democratic Party of  Germnay and for being “non-Aryan”. 
Lederer immigrated to Japan, and then to the USA were he co-founded in 1933 the University in  
Exile at  The  New  School  for  Social  Research  in  New  York  City  under  Alvin  Johnson’s 
leadership (Johnson 2000), which would become the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social 
Science.2 Emil Lederer was its first dean until his sudden death in 1939, in the aftermath of an 
operation.3
Lederer  was considered an important  supporter  of  interdisciplinary social  sciences  in 
Heidelberg. He published the social democratic theory magazine Die Neue Zeit, he did not sup-
port an unregulated free market, he was critical to the inefficiencies caused by monopolies, and 
he denounced the positive effects of technical progress.
3. Economic Development 
In the Japanese edition of his  Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter noted that, when 
first  writing  the  book,  his  purpose  had  been  to  create  “a  theoretic  model  of  the  process  of 
economic change in time [. . .] to answer the question how the economic system generates the 
force which incessantly transforms it” (Clemence, 1951, pp. 158–159). Schumpeter started his 
The Theory of  Economic Development with  a treatise  of  circular  flow which,  excluding any 
innovative  activities,  leads  to  a  stationary  state.  The  stationary  state  is,  according  to  him, 
1 For Lederer’s attempt to sociologically understand the main features of war, especially World War I, see 
Lederer (1979). 
2 Most of the members of this circle wrote interesting essays on the so-called new middle class (i.e. white-
collar workers). However, the so-called  old middle class (i.e. artisans,  farmers and other self-employed 
representatives of small business) was relatively neglected (see e.g. Lederer and Marschak, 1926).
3 In  the  United  States,  Lederer  established  a  lasting  collaboration  with  Marschak,  a  former  pupil  of 
Lederer’s who had taught at the Universities of Heidelberg, Oxford and then in the United States (New 
School of Social Research). Then, he moved to the University of Chicago and later became president of the 
American Economic Association. 
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described by Walrasian equilibrium.4 The Walrasian approach took account of the interdepen-
dences of economic variables but was applicable only to a stationary process,  i.e.  one which 
adapted itself to forces acting on it. 
Schumpeter  described this  equilibrium as “the  circular  flow of economic life”  or  the 
“stationary  flow”  (Schumpeter  1912,  ch.1).  This  state  refers  to  simple  reproduction  and  is 
characterized by the absence of any change. But Schumpeter  made clear  that  this  “stationary 
flow” is only a theoretical abstraction and serves as a reference point (Schumpeter 1928). Yet, 
while Schumpeter was a great admirer of Walras’ scientific method and technique, he apparently 
believed that this vision of the economy was incomplete in that there should be a source of move-
ment within the economic system. Schumpeter defined economic development as “such changes 
in economic life as are not forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from with-
in” (Schumpeter 1912, p. 63). It was a phenomenon foreign to what might be observed in the cir-
cular flow or in the tendency towards equilibrium (ibid, p. 64). It involved spontaneous and dis-
continuous change in the channels of flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever altered and 
displaced the equilibrium state previously existing”. 
According to Schumpeter, economic development is accompanied by growth, however 
quantitative growth does not constitute development per se. He wrote: “[W]hat we are about to 
consider is that kind of change arising from […] the system which so displaces its equilibrium 
point  that  the  new  one  cannot  be  reached  from  the  old  one  by  infinitesimal  steps.  Add 
successively as many coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby” (Schumpeter 
1912,  p.  64).  Real  economic  growth  and  development  depend  primarily  upon  productivity 
increases  based  on  innovation.  More  precisely,  for  Schumpeter  this  concept  covered  the 
following cases: “1. The introduction of a new good […] or a new quality of a good. 2. The 
introduction of a new method of production […]. 3. The opening of a new market […]. 4. The 
4 It is well known that Schumpeter was a great admirer of Walras. In his History of Economic Analysis he 
wrote: “[S]o far as pure theory is concerned Walras is in my opinion the greatest of all economists” and 
suggested  that  Walras’s  work  “will  stand  comparison  with  the  achievements  of  theoretical  physics” 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 827).
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conquest of a new source of supply […]. 5. The carrying out of the new organisation of any 
industry” (Schumpeter 1912, p. 66). 
The hero of his story was, in fine Austrian way, the entrepreneur. What made these indi-
viduals look special was the fact that they had the ability to exploit fully the new possibilities 
which were offered by the surrounding environment (Schumpeter, 1912, pp. 79–80). Schumpeter 
clearly distinguished this  process  from growth due to  the  gradual  increase  in population and 
capital. He wrote: “The slow and continuous increase in time of the national supply of productive 
means and of savings is  obviously an important  factor  in explaining the  course  of  economic 
history  through  centuries,  but  it  is  completely  overshadowed  by  the  fact  that  development 
consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different way, in doing new things with 
them, irrespective of whether those resources increase or not” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 65).
In  practice,  economic  systems  do  not  achieve  equilibrium.  They  just  move  into  what 
Schumpeter  calls  “neighborhoods of  equilibrium [...]  in  which the  system approaches  a state 
which would, if reached, fulfil equilibrium conditions” (Schumpeter 1936, p. 45). In fact, in his 
Business Cycles Schumpeter (1939, p. 106) emphasized that major innovations, which initiate 
new expansions, are introduced around the neighborhood of equilibrium because conditions are, 
in a sense, ideal. It is in this neighborhood of equilibrium that economic conditions are stable and 
therefore possible to make reliable calculations. Consequently, uncertainties are at their lowest. 
As regards the market structure favoring economic evolution, Schumpeter believed that 
perfect competition is not favorable, for two reasons: (a) it cannot lead to high profitability and 
thus  it  cannot  create  real  incentives  for  innovation;  (b)  it  cannot  create  incentives  for  the 
capitalist  and the enterprise to undertake risky and uncertain projects,  because it  is unable to 
guarantee, as a reward, an extra profit. More precisely, by incorporating new technologies, new 
types  of  organization,  etc.,  innovations  create  surpluses  of  revenues  over  costs.  Competition, 
however, tends to eliminate these extra revenues (extra profits), but the “spread of monopolist 
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structures” and the ability of  big enterprises to promote innovation constantly recreates them 
(Schumpeter 1942, p. 81 ff.).  
In  fact,  in  his  Theory  of  Economic  Development,  the  predominant  role  of  large 
oligopolistic firms in technical innovation was acknowledged: “And if the competitive economy 
is broken up by the growth of great combines, as it is increasingly the case today in all countries, 
then this must become more and more true of real life, and the carrying out of new combinations 
must become in ever greater measure the internal concern of one and the same economic body. 
The difference so made is great enough to serve as the water-shed between two epochs in the 
social history of capitalism’ (Schumpeter 1912, p. 67).
Lederer’s conception of economic development is very close to Schumpeter’s approach. In 
brief,  for  Lederer  economic  development  constitutes:  “the  opening  up  of  new  markets,  the 
manufacture of new products, and improved methods of production in the broadest sense of the 
term” (Lederer 1938, p. 230). Lederer’s vision seems to converge significantly. He considers the 
concept of equilibrium insufficient to analyze properly an economic system. He notes that for it 
to have any meaning we must fix the data and “the inherent  or observed tendencies  towards 
change would have to be ignored.” According to him “the idea of economic equilibrium can be 
effectively applied under a static system, but such a system is based on assumptions that remove 
it from most of the problems that have to be dealt with in actual practice” (ibid, p. 78). However, 
the examination of a static system is not worthless because in the short-term, when most of the 
dynamic factors  can  be considered  fixed,  it  is  not  devoid of  explanatory  power.  In his  own 
words: “Perhaps theory of a stationary system is necessary in its general outline as the basis for 
any dynamic scheme-but this requires a theory of its own, and cannot be fertilized by further 
refinements of abstract and pure theory” (Lederer 1936, p. 159).
Lederer advocated the definition of the static system in the narrowest sense (the growth of 
population and capital is assumed to be zero) because “the static system must serve as a basis for 
comparison”  and  “the  accidental  inclusion  of  one  or  more  elements  of  the  dynamic  system 
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creates confusion in which it is difficult to distinguish the essentials of a static system and the 
consequences of disturbances from the outside” (Lederer 1938, p. 86). The same methodological 
principle was followed by Schumpeter in the exposition of his Business Cycles where he used the 
concept of a static equilibrium defined in the narrowest sense, in order to explain the mechanism 
which sets the system into motion from a state of immobility.
Lederer used the insights that a static system can offer to prove the existence of permanent 
unemployment that may ensue even in an actual dynamic system “if there are structural obstacles 
to any rapid change in quantitative ratios or in prices in the dynamic system” (ibid, p. 81). For 
Lederer the utilization of all factors of production is not a justifiable proposition even for a static 
system. The full utilization would presuppose the destruction or neglect of all surplus factors that 
exist in a system. Lederer noted that the optimistic view which delineates the static equilibrium 
as a state characterized by the absence of idle factors “comes from the attitude of the laissez faire 
school, which invested the economic system with a harmony that is entirely unjustified within 
the dry and precise framework of the static system” (ibid, p. 81).
In practice, however, it is necessary to “consider a longer period, with the changes that 
may normally be expected to occur within it. In that case the concept of static equilibrium has no 
meaning. That is why the concept of moving equilibrium was developed in its place” (ibid, p. 91) 
and “this moving equilibrium means a system of ‘disturbances’” (ibid, p. 91) the combination of 
which produces a dynamic system where any regressive movements, which might occur, do not 
preclude further progress. 
Just  like  Schumpeter,  Lederer  explicitly  earmarked  technical  development  as  the 
distinguishing characteristic  of  a  real  dynamic system compared  to  a  static  or  a  harmonious 
dynamic  system:  “the  most  important  factor  in  the  dynamic  process  […]  is  technical 
development” (ibid, p. 89). And made clear that technical progress should be excluded in order to 
define his own stationary state: “The combination of (a) [psychological factors] and (b) [growing 
population] without technical progress would make it possible to have a uniformly developing 
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dynamic system without cyclical fluctuations – that is, a system in which population, plant, and 
production would increase uniformly from year to year” (ibid, p. 88),  
Later on, he added: “Here again therefore we must use the method of isolation and try to 
study the effects of technical progress in an atmosphere of economic calm. We cannot indeed 
make pure statics our starting point, but must assume a steadily progressive economy in which no 
disturbances  take place and which may be said to be in a state  of “dynamic equilibrium” or 
growth. In accordance with this concept, we must also assume that our system is organized to 
ensure a uniform expansion of the process of production (e.g. by 1 per cent yearly), accompanied 
by a parallel increase in the number of workers employed” (ibid, p. 162). 
Ηis view was, in general terms, consistent with the Schumpeterian approach of “moving 
equilibrium”.  Of  course,  he  noted  that  it  “might  lead  to  confusion,  because  what  actually 
happened was a disturbance of equilibrium in the ordinary sense of that term” (ibid, p. 91). In 
order to make things clear he added: “It is quite true to say that dynamic development can be 
adequately understood only if its essential feature is taken as being not a tendency to equilibrium 
but a series of impulses constantly driving it beyond the point it has reached. In this movement 
the tendency towards equilibrium exists only as an undercurrent” (ibid, pp. 91-92). Conclusively, 
he argued that the concept of moving equilibrium is not very satisfactory because “movement is 
such an important feature of the system that the idea of equilibrium would have to take on an 
entirely new aspect” (ibid, p. 92).
The emergence of monopolies and cartels occupy an important role in Lederer’s work. In 
his Technical Progress and Unemployment Lederer used a numerical example on the adoption of 
a new cost-reducing technique by a small number of firms within a branch of industry. He con-
cluded that  these firms would quickly obtain excessive profits  and will  dominate the market. 
Lederer conceived the relation of technical progress and monopolies in a way similar to Schum-
peter: “[O]wing to its command and knowledge of the market and its power of deciding freely 
and with full knowledge of the circumstances on the technique to be adopted, a monopoly will be 
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better able to transfer its operations to a lower level of costs and prices than one operating under 
free competition. Even assuming that under free competition too firms can react immediately to 
every opportunity of reducing their costs, monopoly undertakings are still more likely to make a 
change when it involves heavy investment (and therefore a greater need for capital) and a very 
large expansion of output, as in the case of mass production” (ibid, p. 133)5. Lederer also, men-
tioned the tendency for cartelization and monopolization of the market and considered this mar-
ket structure to have destabilizing effects, due to the rigidity they introduce to the price system 
thus prolonging the depression period (see further Allgoewer 2003, p. 333; pp. 335-336).
4. Technology 
4.1 On Innovation   
 
As we have seen, for Schumpeter economic development was mostly the result of innovation, i.e. 
“the outstanding fact in the economic history of capitalist society” (Schumpeter 1939, p. 61). For 
him, innovation is the leading force in what he calls “evolution”. Economic evolution is however 
discontinuous  because  of  a  discontinuity  in  the  introduction  of  major  innovations  into  the 
economic system. 
However, Schumpeter’s concept of innovation was different than is generally assumed 
because he stressed that innovation per se, i.e., simply as new ideas or new combinations, is not a 
force  in  economic  development.  Rather  the  true  force  in  economic  development  is  the 
consequences of these innovations (Schumpeter 1928).
These consequences make innovations a force in economic evolution and innovations 
which do not produce these consequences could not be a force in the economic development of a 
social  formation.  Economic evolution begins when an exceptional  entrepreneur introduces an 
5 For a discussion of the central importance of trust in a market economy, the unstable nature of market 
economies and the “corporatist” approach see Perelman (1998, 1994, 2006).
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innovation.  This  enables  him to  make  monopolistic  profits  and  stimulates  the  borrowing  of 
capital in order to increase the investment. This activity of the first entrepreneur smoothes the 
path  for  other  entrepreneurs  to  introduce  innovations.  This  “swarming  of  entrepreneurs”  is 
financed through credit creation, i.e. “the monetary complement of innovation”. Credit permits 
these firms to “bid away” factors of production from older non-innovating firms. 
The innovations produce qualitative changes in the economic system: “[The] historic and 
irreversible changes in the way of doing things we call “innovation” and we define: innovations 
are changes in production functions which cannot be decomposed into infinitesimal steps. [...] 
The kind of wave-like  movement,  which we call  the  business  cycle,  is  incident  to  industrial 
change and would be impossible in an economic world displaying nothing except unchanging 
repetition of the productive and consumptive process” (Schumpeter 1935, p. 4).
However,  for  Schumpeter,  an  explanation  of  economic  development  is  not  simply 
explaining innovation, as the result of other economic factors. Instead, an explanation consists in 
finding a causal relation (Schumpeter 1912, p. 5). In other words, innovations are not the cause 
of  economic  development.  According  to  Schumpeter,  causality  is  to  be  found  in  motives. 
Motives are the adequate explanation of the causes of economic phenomena which link economic 
conduct to motives (ibid, p. 10). Thus, the real cause of development is to be found at the level of 
what motivates the entrepreneur to undertake innovation. 
Just like Schumpeter, Lederer emphasized technical development as the distinguishing 
characteristic of the economic system (see e.g. Lederer 1931; Lederer 1933, pp. 1-26). But why 
is technical change so important according to Lederer? Because, compared to other causes of 
change,  technical  development  brings  about  sudden  change  which  cannot  be  absorbed  with 
readjustments and adaptation in a harmonious process,  just  like in the Schumpeterian system 
(Lederer 1938, p. 89). Technical development is, thus, responsible for “the extensive ups and 
downs in production that  are typical  of our modern  capitalist  process” (ibid,  p. 90).  See also 
Lederer (1931, p. 112).
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Then, he stressed the fact that “[i]t is idle to consider technical development simply as 
non-economic  phenomenon  and  therefore  of  relatively  little  importance,  involving  merely  a 
change in data which cannot change the nature of economic process” (ibid, p. 90). A little later 
Lederer, in a Schumpeterian spirit, added that: “technical progress […] is therefore a real factor 
which alone could have moulded the course of modern economic development along the lines in 
which we know it” (ibid, p. 90). See also Allgoewer (2003, pp. 336-340).
Lederer, just like Schumpeter, looked behind the crucial role of innovations to detect the 
very motive of economic acts inducing economic evolution. According to him, a possible motive 
is the “[d]ynamic psychology on the part of individual economic subjects. Persons who are not 
satisfied with the beaten track strike out along new lines when they see a prospect of profit. This 
dynamic attitude may be deduced from the economic principle that man always endeavouring to 
better his situation” (ibid, p. 86).
Lederer followed Schumpeter, in a fine Austrian fashion, and the entrepreneur was, for 
once again, the hero: “This particular kind of initiative is restricted to the entrepreneur type. The 
desire for advancement which people who are not entrepreneurs also experience induces them to 
save.[…] Saving,  however,  only pays  the  people  who perform this  function  in  so far  as  the 
entrepreneurs  invest  and  they  themselves  are  willing  to  hand  over  their  savings  to  the 
entrepreneurs for this purpose” (ibid, p. 86).
4.2 On Technological Unemployment
Regarding the relation between technological change and unemployment, the views of 
both Schumpeter and Lederer converge. Schumpeter considered technological unemployment as 
an inevitable  side-effect  of  evolution  based  on innovative  activity.  Schumpeter  gave a  broad 
definition to the term “technological unemployment” analogous to the definition of “innovation”: 
“[F]or  the  special  case  of  unemployment  arising  from disturbance  by  innovation  within  the 
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system we will set up a distinct class, to be called Technological Unemployment. This term […] 
has always been intended to cover displacement of workmen by machinery. We make it cover a 
much wider range and include not only the effects on employment of every kind of change in 
industry and commerce – organizational change, for instance – but also the effects which changes 
have on employment in firms or industries that are competed with by the firms of industries that 
introduce new production functions” (Schumpeter 1939, Vol 2, p. 514, emphasis added). 
Schumpeter  went  on  to  define  cyclical  unemployment  as  the  “total  by  which 
unemployment  varies  in  the  course  of  cycles”  (ibid,  p.  515)  and  then  continued  noting  that 
“cyclical  unemployment  is technological  unemployment”.  The  emergence  of  dislocations  is 
explicitly  connected  to  the  readjustments  that  take  place  during  the  cyclical  process: 
“Technological unemployment […] linking up as it does with innovation is cyclical by nature. 
[P]eriods of prolonged supernormal unemployment coincide with the periods in which the results 
of innovations are spreading over the system and in which reaction to them by the system is 
dominating the business situation” (ibid, p. 515).
According to Schumpeter this kind of unemployment may be called “frictional” since the 
“instantaneous adaptation of the system would kill it at birth”. Despite this, he did not deny “the 
importance  of  the  phenomenon or  the  sufferings  it  inflicts”  but  conclusively noted  that  “the 
primary long-run interest of the working class is in the effects of innovation on the total real 
wage  bill  and  not  in  the  incident  variation  of  employment,  which  is  but  an  element  of  the 
mechanism that produces the changes of the former and can be separately handled by public 
policy” (ibid, pp. 515-516). Clearly, Schumpeter did not believe that equilibrating forces of the 
free market can secure automatically the re-absorption of the displaced workers, however he saw 
in innovation a disruptive force but with a positive net result in the long-run.
Lederer is also clear about the existence of technological unemployment, induced by the 
introduction of labor-saving techniques6, and in Technical Progress and Unemployment made a 
6 In his book about Japan, Lederer notes that “the low wages, both money and real, have been favorable to 
the expansion of Japan’s international trade. But the low wages are due to the oversupply of workers, and as 
a result of mechanization and improving efficiency they are not likely to find employment easily” (Lederer 
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detailed examination of this phenomenon. In the first place, he raised an objection against claims 
that automatic adjustment is ensured by the market mechanism. According to his argument there 
is a contradiction in the contention that technical progress does not alter the demand for labor 
due  to  increased  profits  or  reduced  costs  which  will  both  bring  about  new investments  and 
expansion  of  production  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  allegation  that  “labour-saving  technical 
improvements by which workers are displaced diminish the marginal productivity of labour and 
thus  necessitate  a  reduction  of  wages”  (Lederer  1938,  p.  9)  which  characterizes  the 
argumentation of  laissez faire school. His criticism to that line of thought rests also upon the 
social  effects  of  labor  displacement:  “[E]conomists  often  admit  that  technical  progress  may 
involve  dislocation,  although  their  logical  arguments  point  to  the  opposite  direction.  They 
explain this by saying that the dislocation is only temporary. But is this a valid argument? Human 
life itself is also temporary, and in matters of economics, interest will  accordingly always be 
centered  in  changes  which  are  of  vital  importance  to  any  one  generation,  even  if  they  will 
ultimately be assimilated to the general process” (ibid,  p. 147).  The only important  question, 
therefore, is if  medium-term unemployment can be attributed, at  least partly, to technological 
progress (see also Diebolt 2006, pp. 6-7). 
Initially, Lederer rejected the compensation theory which was based on the arguments 
that the displaced workers would be absorbed by the industries producing the same machines that 
are responsible for their unemployment and on the fact that technical progress does not reduce 
total purchasing power and thus the demand for labor cannot diminish. With regard to the first 
argument  Lederer  noted  that  it  is  practically  irrelevant  because  it  would  presuppose  “an 
accelerating expansion of capital accumulation and investment” which is only possible for short 
term periods and with the aid of external factors like “export to other economic territories” (ibid, 
p.149). As far as the second statement is concerned, Lederer argued that there is no connection 
essentially  between the  preservation  of  the  total  purchasing power  and the  sustention  of  the 
and Lederer-Seidler, 1938, p. 255).
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demand for labor in the same level. In fact demand for labor could perfectly well decrease (ibid, 
p. 151). Overall, his analysis pointed to the absence of automatic compensation mechanisms and 
he  finally  came to  the  conclusion  that  the  introduction  of  labor-saving techniques  “set(s)  in 
motion a lengthy process of adjustment, and it is not until the final stages of this process are 
reached that the unemployment can be reabsorbed” (ibid, p. 218). See also Allgoewer (2003, pp. 
339-340).        
It should be noted that there is a difference in the way Schumpeter and Lederer defined 
technological unemployment. Schumpeter’s definition covers all the cases where an innovation is 
applied  and,  as  was  discussed  earlier,  encompassed  a  very  wide  range  of  phenomena 
(‘inventions’  and ‘technical improvements’ as defined by Lederer  both come under that same 
heading). Meanwhile, Lederer considered technological unemployment as the result of technical 
improvements  and  in  particular  of  labor-saving  technical  improvements.  Overall,  Lederer 
considered the effects of labor-saving technical  improvements to be more closely linked with 
medium-term unemployment than inventions because the later “will  not reduce the volume of 
employment but may even increase it temporarily during the period of actual investment” (ibid, 
p. 25).
To sum up, there is a common tendency to Schumpeter and Lederer to regard innovation 
as a determining factor of the evolutionary process of the economic system. Schumpeter’s and 
Lederer’s visions are very similar with respect to the subjective motives that are responsible for 
the  introduction  of  innovations.  They  also  agree  on  their  disruptive  character  and  more 
specifically  on the  effects  that  the  introduction  of  innovation  is  bound to  have on the  labor 
market. 
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5.  Credit 
Schumpeter was realist enough to see that if someone wants to function as entrepreneur, he must 
raise funds. The provision of credit comes from the capitalist. The capitalist may, of course, use 
funds  which  are  themselves  the  result  of  successful  innovation  and  entrepreneurial  profit 
(Schumpeter 1912, p. 72). The capitalist bears the financial risk (the entrepreneur risks his job 
and his reputation) and, because capital utilization is nothing but the diversion of the factors of 
production to new uses (ibid, p. 116), the capitalist has some power to dictate new directions to 
production (te Velde 2001, p. 7).  
In his Theory of Economic Development Schumpeter defined economic development as a 
phenomenon “entirely foreign to what maybe observed in the circular flow or in the tendency 
toward equilibrium”; it is a “spontaneous and discontinuous change in the channels of the flow, 
disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously 
existing” (Schumpeter 1912, p. 64), so that the “new combination of means of production” and 
“credit” were the “fundamental phenomena of economic development” (ibid, p. 74). 
Schumpeter stressed the importance “of credit means of payment created ad-hoc, which 
can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence” (ibid, p. 
106). In this manner, credit  performs the functions of “enabling the entrepreneur to withdraw 
producers’ goods which he needs from their previous employments, by exercising a demand for 
them,  and  thereby  to  force  the  economic  system  into  new  channels”  (ibid, p.  106).  For 
Schumpeter credit provided an additional purchasing power that enables to foster development 
“Granting credit in this sense operates as an order on the economic system to accommodate itself 
to the purposes of the entrepreneur” (ibid, p. 107). However, according to de Vecchi (1995, p. 
27), the assumption of the entrepreneur funding his enterprise by savings or previous profits is a 
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very realistic one but would not provide an adequate explanation for the process of economic 
change. 7
Lederer’s view is consistent with Schumpeter’s thesis that anyone who wants to act as 
entrepreneur in the pursuit of profit, he must raise funds, the provision of which comes from the 
capitalist.  The  capitalist  may,  of  course,  use  funds  which  are  themselves  the  result  of 
entrepreneurial profit or just the incentive for new profit: “Heavy demands on the credit market 
are therefore only likely to arise as the result of sudden prospects of large profits” (Lederer 1938, 
p. 230).  In this context, Lederer regarded credit as an indispensable phenomenon of economic 
expansion just like Schumpeter did: “fresh opportunities arise of expanding production through 
credit” (ibid, p. 230). In fact, the possible absence of credit from the economic system would be 
catastrophic for many industries (Stern 1938). In Lederer's words: “without any credit expansion 
the  static  industries  would  have  contracted”  (ibid,  p.  230).  Consequently,  the  only  way  of 
preventing  a  capitalist  enterprise  from  expansion  would  be  the  absence  of  credit:  “the 
introduction of a new process of production can only be held up by the absence of extra means of 
payment” (ibid, p. 224). See also Lederer (1925, pp. 354-413).
Economic activity is not financed by the savings of the past (i.e. of the recession phase) 
but only from additional credit (or new savings) which is equal to the creation of supplementary 
production  capacity  :  “Der  zusätzliche  Kredit  mit  der  bekannten  Wirkung  des  erzwungenen 
Sparens ist  mit der Erzeugung von zusätzlichen Produktionsmitteln gleichbedeutend” (Lederer 
1930,  p.  514).  For  Lederer,  additional  credit  is  what  matters  as  far  as  the  business  cycle  is 
concerned. “[N]o cyclical development can be explained or described without taking account of 
the  monetary  aspect,  additional  credit  providing  the  fuel  without  which  any dynamic  power 
would spend itself  very quickly” (Lederer  1936,  p. 156, emphasis  added)  and:  “Es wird also 
7 De  Vecchi  analyzes  the  interaction  of  individuals  and  institutions  in  Schumpeter’s  work  and  most 
specifically that between entrepreneurs and credit: “With credit […] what counts in explaining economic 
change is the bank’s method of permitting some innovation projects to be carried out, rather than others: 
this is creating credit  ex novo,  presented by Schumpeter as one of the distinctive features of the capitalist 
form of production. All other bank activities in a capitalist system (starting from the intermediary operations 
between saving and investment) are secondary from this point of view” (de Vecchi 1995, p. 6). 
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immer dort, wo eine Möglichkeit dazu vorhanden ist, solcher zusätzlicher Kredit  die Wirkung 
zusätzlicher Produktion nach sich ziehen” (Lederer 1925, p. 382). See also Dielbolt (2006, p. 7-
9).
Lederer’s  thesis  has  striking  similarities  with  Schumpeter’s  respective  thesis 
emphasizing the discontinuous character of the need for credit which is one of the driving forces 
of  economic  development:  “In  the  more  advanced  stages  of  economic  development  [...]  the 
demands for credit [...] arise spasmodically on the capital market” (ibid, p. 230). Lederer stressed 
the importance of innovation in raising credit since technical improvements is the main reason 
for credit  creation by the part of the entrepreneur:  “Heavy demands on the credit  market are 
therefore  only  likely  to  arise  as  the  result  of  sudden  prospects  of  large  profits,  created  in 
particular by the opening up of new markets, the manufacture of new products, and improved 
methods of production in the broadest sense of the term. But [...] technical progress [...] may be 
regarded as the main cause of the demands for credit which arise” (ibid, p. 230).
To sum up, credit is given special attention by both theoreticians and it is considered as 
indispensable for the functioning of capitalism. Schumpeter and Lederer linked credit creation 
with entrepreneurship and regarded it as a precondition for the introduction of innovations.  
6. Economic Fluctuations
The two theoreticians’ views on the nature of economic fluctuations converge considerably, as 
was  the  case  with  their  respective  theses  analyzed  in  the  previous  sections.  The  popular 
interpretation  of  Schumpeter’s  theory  is  that  long  waves  are  caused by  the  clustering  of 
innovations. However, to be more precise, according to Schumpeter the clustering of innovations 
is  not the cause of long waves  per se. Instead, long waves are due to the  consequences of this 
clustering.8 Schumpeter  conceptualized  long  waves  as  disturbances  in  the  equilibrium and  a 
8 Here Schumpeter refers to:  (1) the construction of new plants and the rebuilding of old plants, (2) new 
firms  which  are  founded  for  the  purpose  of  capitalising  on  specific  innovations,  and  (3)  the  rise  to 
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return to  a new equilibrium point which  gives the process its cyclical character.9 All economic 
systems have an esoteric tendency towards equilibrium and move toward these “neighborhoods” 
after  the  disruptions  have  exhausted  themselves.  The  most  important  characteristic  of  these 
“neighborhoods” is that economic conditions are stable (Schumpeter 1912, p. 214). 
Economic evolution begins when an entrepreneur introduces an innovation, which en-
ables this exceptional entrepreneur to make (monopolistic) profit and stimulates the borrowing of 
capital in order to finance new investments. The activity of the first entrepreneur smoothes the 
path for other entrepreneurs. This “swarming of entrepreneurs” is financed through credit cre-
ation. Credit permits these firms to “bid away” factors of production from older, non-innovating 
firms. In turn, this produces a rise in the level of prices and a general economic expansion which 
characterizes the first phase (i.e. prosperity) of Schumpeter's model. Prosperity reaches its upper 
point for several reasons. Older non-innovating firms, which are unable to compete with new 
firms, suffer losses. New investments are halted and it is impossible to make calculations. The 
possibilities offered by the innovations are exhausted. The subsequent downturn marks the sec-
ond phase (i.e. recession) of the cycle. The decline continues attributed to “errors, excess of opti-
mism [...]. Reckless, fraudulent and otherwise unsuccessful enterprises created in the optimism 
of expansion cannot stand the test administered by Recession” (Schumpeter 1939, p. 122). They 
are  liquidated  and these  liquidations  cause  a  “panic”.  Meanwhile,  deposits  shrink and credit 
tightens. Because of this situation, firms which would have been able to sustain the pressure are 
liquidated and there is “a shrinkage of operations that reduces them, quite erratically, below their 
equilibrium levels” (ibid, p. 125). These liquidations and the shrinkage of enterprises constitute 
the third phase (i.e. depression) of the cycle. Depression continues until all (unsuccessful) invest-
leadership of new men (Schumpeter 1939, pp. 68-71).
9 According to Schumpeter, economic systems do not achieve equilibrium but, rather, move into “neighbor-
hoods of equilibrium [...] in which the system approaches a state which would, if reached, fulfill equilibrium 
conditions” (Schumpeter 1939, p. 45). 
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ments are liquidated, and once this point is reached, a movement towards a new “neighborhood 
of equilibrium” signifies the fourth phase (i.e. revival).10 
Schumpeter stressed actors in his analysis of economic fluctuations. He wrote: “Social 
facts are the result of human conduct, economic facts result from economic conduct and the latter 
may be defined as conduct directed towards the acquisition of goods [...]. The field of economic 
facts is first of all delimited by economic conduct” (Schumpeter 1912, pp. 3-4). After all: “insta-
bility may arise from particular influences from without, which cannot properly be charged to the 
economic system at all” (Schumpeter 1928, p. 362)11. 
Hence, an acceptable explanation has to link economic conduct to motives (Schumpeter 
1912, p. 10). Thus, the cause of long waves lies at the level of what motivates the entrepreneur. 
Thus, it is necessary to explain what drives entrepreneur to innovate. These factors could be ac-
counted but the subjective meanings of the individual entrepreneurs cannot. In other words, en-
trepreneurs may innovate for reasons of ambition, greed, hate, etc but these reasons remain, prac-
tically, unknown.  In his  own words: “Economic conduct  may have  any motive” (Schumpeter 
1939, p. 10, emphasis added). 
Lederer, too, attempted to provide a theoretical explanation of the business cycle, an is-
sue which he regarded as being of great importance: “We can say without exaggeration that the 
bulk of modern theory is business-cycle theory” (Lederer 1936, p. 157). Lederer’s vision of busi-
ness cycles, as an endogenous phenomenon inseparably linked with the growth process of a capi-
talist society, remains unchanged in all his works. However, Lederer’s conceptualization of busi-
ness cycles underwent modifications in certain aspects and when his 1925 article Konjunktur und 
Krisen is compared to his 1938 book Technical Progress and Unemployment the differences are 
discernible. See also Allgoewer (2003).
10 Schumpeter emphasized that a cycle is “a historical individual and not merely an arbitrary unit created by 
the observer” (Schumpeter 1939, p. 131).  Each wave is a break with the past and the economic system 
which emerges is qualitatively different from the economic system previously existing. In other words, long 
waves are not “imperfections” in the economic system. Instead, the innovations propelling these waves pro-
duce real qualitative changes in the economic system (Schumpeter 1935, p. 4).
11 For a discussion on entrepreneur’s motives and personality in early Schumpeter’s works see also de 
Vecchi (1995, pp. 16-19).
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Lederer’s  conception of the business cycle in  Technical  Progress and Unemployment 
(1938) is, apparently, very ‘Schumpeterian’. The initiation of a boom is explained by supply-side 
factors,  and more specifically by technical change. Technical  change is decomposed into two 
types, which have entirely different effects, namely ‘rationalization’ and ‘inventions’. 
The term ‘inventions’ was used by Lederer to describe “technical innovations as led to 
the production of goods which enlarge the scale of needs” (Lederer 1938, p. 7) and create “ hith-
erto unknown ‘genuine’ or ‘social’ needs” (Lederer 1938, p. 24). The new firms, which adopt in-
ventions compel ‘old’ firms to react to the new situation or become obsolete:  “most of these 
commodities have a double character: they lead on the one hand to the realization of new neces-
sities and lead so far to an expansion of the total production, but in most cases they compete with 
other branches of production too” (Lederer 1938, p.23). The introduction of inventions leads to a 
general expansion of the economic system: “inventions lead to an expansion of the whole system 
of production and a parallel increase in the total purchasing power of the community, through the 
creation of money or a rise in the velocity of circulation. These effects cannot be regarded as dis-
turbances but must be recognized as one of the fundamental forms of the growth of the industrial 
system” (Lederer 1938, p. 135). Lederer’s analysis of the booming period after the introduction 
of inventions does not mention the possibility of a depression phase following it.
Rationalization is the second type of technological change responsible for the appearance 
of fluctuations. In Lederer’s work it is a general concept covering every cost-saving process (ei-
ther capital-saving or labor-saving) related to increased efficiency in organization. In contrast to 
the application of inventions, rationalization and especially labor-saving technical improvements 
do not ensure unhindered growth and can have serious social repercussions. The boom period 
signaled by the application of technical progress “creates a new initial situation enabling employ-
ment capacity to be enlarged by a fresh combination of capital and labor, which can be financed 
by recourse to extra short and long-term credit” (Lederer 1938, pp. 233-4). 
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As we have noted repeatedly, for Lederer credit expansion was a necessary complement 
to the new undertakings in a way analogous to the Schumpeterian description of the process. He 
even stressed the importance of credit  creation in explaining business cycles by emphatically 
arguing that: “The discussions of the last fifteen years, however, have led to the general convic-
tion that no cyclical development can be explained or described without taking account of  the 
monetary aspect, additional credit providing the fuel without which any dynamic power would 
spend itself very quickly” (Lederer 1936, p. 156, emphasis added). 
However, when the initial wave of expansion, caused by rationalization, new investments 
and credit  creation,  has subsided,  and firms are forced to repay the  loans  from their  profits, 
depression will set in, resulting in unemployment: “the decline in employment in the mechanized 
industries, which was concealed by the general increase in employment and activity while the 
boom lasted,  will  begin to make itself  generally felt” (Lederer  1938,  p. 244).  His analysis  is 
mainly focused on the prospects of re-absorption of the displaced workers that rationalization has 
produced and so he does not provide a detailed theoretical description of the depression phase.12 
Regarding the prospects of a revival that are reinforced through the course of the depres-
sion phase, Lederer explicitly mentioned the possibilities of a new phase of expansion that are 
created during phases of depression in the monetary sphere: “Every depression […] will, owing 
to the severe shrinkage of production, renew the possibilities of monetary expansion; the total 
circulation of money diminishes, the velocity of circulation is retarded, and reserves increase. 
This means that side by side with the displacement of the factors of capital and labour from pro-
duction, fresh opportunities arise of expanding production through credit” (ibid, p. 227).
Despite Lederer’s lack of a complete theoretical exposition of the business cycle phases 
and effects, he shared common insights with Schumpeter. One theme they have in common was 
the role that unsound credit plays in the  causation of a depression phase. Lederer warned that 
12Lederer analyzes various cases in which the form of the production function (increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale),  the elasticity of demand (greater, lower or equal to unity) the structure of the market 
(perfect competition or cartels) and the existence of unused reserves are taken into account in their different 
combinations to examine the conditions that will enable re-absorption of the displaced workers. 
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there are dangers inherent in the process of credit expansion which takes place in the prosperity 
phase. As was already mentioned, the function of credit expansion is the financing of new invest-
ments especially during boom periods. The initial credit expansion will be spent on working cap-
ital but in the long-run the need will arise for additional fixed capital. This need will manifest it-
self first of all as increasing demand for working capital in the capital goods industries and later 
on as an investment demand both in the consumption goods and in the capital good industries. 
The danger inherent in this sequence of events was, according to Lederer, the inability to consoli-
date the provoked credit expansion from the savings (profits): “It is true that every expansion of 
production implies a possible increase in the volume of savings, but dangerous stresses may arise 
if the reserves of idle savings are small and if business credit is expanded to an extent exceeding 
the rise in savings which may be expected as a result of the boom, an eventuality which is all too 
probable, because modern systems of payments permit of a rapid increase in the supply of money 
and therefore in business credits” (ibid, pp. 230-1). The process described here parallels with the 
phase of depression in Schumpeter’s schema which is characterized by unsound credit and ill-
founded undertakings (Schumpeter  1928).  Both writers attributed this  state to the uncertainty 
which prevails during booms and may lead to erroneous expectations. 
Another obvious similarity exists in the abstract model that both Lederer and Schumpeter 
used to describe the onset of the boom period. They both conceptualized a stationary economy 
without savings and unused reserves. As it has been mentioned, the impulse which sets the sys-
tem in motion is the application of innovations. Both writers in their exposition of their respec-
tive model made the simplifying assumption that these innovations will be implemented by the 
setting up of new enterprises and the building of new plants. The new enterprises demand the 
creation of new credit in order to finance their plans. Due to the assumptions concerning the ini-
tial state, the materialization of their business plans forces them to exercise a demand for produc-
er’s goods and labor force. Prices of producer’s goods and wages rise up (wages will rise at a 
slower rate) and a shift of demand from consumer’s to producer’s goods will be observed leading 
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simultaneously to an increase in the price of consumer’s goods (Dielbolt 2006, p. 10). Differen-
tial  profits  will  be  earned  in  the  course  of  the  prosperity  period  (Schumpeter  1939,  Vol.  1, 
pp.130-8; Lederer 1938, pp. 236-8).
Lederer’s analysis of the business cycle in 1938 was differentiated from that of his earli-
er work. In his first attempt, in Konjunktur und Krisen (1925), Lederer had constructed an expla-
nation  consistent  with  the  so–called  “disproportionality  theory”  introduced  by  Tugan–Bara-
nowsky and later adopted by Hilferding and others (see Section 7)13. Lederer argued that: “Al-
most all the cycle theories agree about the nature of these disturbances-they are disproportionali-
ties” (ibid, p. 156). 
In this work, the boom period starts due to an increase in effective demand14, which is 
attributed to the social groups with fixed incomes (i.e.  public employees and rentiers).  Credit 
creation follows as an essential component of the booming period. This phase is characterized by 
an  increase  in  prices  although  this  increase  is  disproportional  in  the  various  sectors  of  the 
economy: prices in the producer’s goods sector will typically raise more compared to consumer’s 
goods.15 In addition to this, the increase in wages will be also at lower rates compared to those of 
prices thus the real wages will decrease. The slower rate of increase in wages is the explanation 
for the existence of extra profits during this phase of the cycle. A redistribution of income will 
take place from wage-earners to capitalists. The composition of demand will as a result, contain a 
greater  part  of  demand  for  investment  goods  than  demand  for  consumer  goods  (on  the 
assumption that profits are invested and wages are spent on consumption). The general trend will 
therefore be a disproportional growth rate between the sectors of producer goods and consumer 
13 Disproportional developments in the producer and consumer goods sectors in the course of the 
business cycle are considered in Allgoewer (2003, p. 333) to be one common point between Lederer’s 1925 
analysis and Schumpeter’s work on business cycles. While Schumpeter acknowledged the importance of 
disproportionality (“[T]his  idea […] is  moreover  easy to  substantiate  from certain  very obvious facts” 
[Schumpeter 1954, p. 1133]) he avoids attributing a causative role to them. He stressed the importance of 
looking for  “the definite  factors  that  are  to  account  for  it”  and  concluded  that  “those  factors  and  not 
disproportionality per se will individuate an author’s theory” (ibid, p. 1133).
14 Unlike his 1938 contribution where, as it was explained before, he placed emphasis in supply-side 
factors. 
15 This immediate change in prices is typical of Kontradieff's analysis (1992, p. 389). 
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goods. This discrepancy will be revealed at the turning point of the cycle when it will become 
clear  that  the  growth  which  took  place  in  the  producer  goods  sector  is  not  matched  by  a 
corresponding growth in the demand for final goods. 
The insufficiency of demand, which signals the initiation of the depression phase, will be 
felt, according to Lederer, most probably in heavy industries. However it will spread through the 
whole of the economy and decreases in prices and profits will be observed. Wages will fall at a 
slower rate than prices and the explanation offered is that the contracts which determine them are 
less prone to change than prices. The redistribution of income will be reverse compared to the 
prosperity period. The real wages will rise in parallel with the increase in purchasing power of 
the fixed income group. The later social category is again considered to play a pivotal role in the 
revival of the economy. The relative stability of their incomes is a decisive factor in restoring the 
levels of effective demand and initiating a new prosperity period. 
However, in Lederer’s early explanation of the business cycle, it is not very clear what 
the ultimate cause of the boom period is. Allgoewer (2003, p. 331) described Lederer’s vision of 
the business cycle as demand-driven and assigned the leading role to classes with fixed incomes, 
the purchasing power of which increases during the crisis phase. Meanwhile, Allgoewer (2003) 
regarded credit as an essential precondition but not as the ultimate cause of the cycle. On the oth-
er hand, Moszkowska (1935), classified Lederer’s analysis as a credit theory of the cycle. These 
conflicting views probably reflect Lederer’s ambiguity on the issue (Moszkowska 1935, p. 69).16
Up to this point, we have emphasized the affinity between Schumpeter’s and Lederer’s 
analyses  regarding  the  issues  of  economic  change,  technology,  credit  and  economic 
fluctuations17. In the next section, we are going to discuss the affinities between Schumpeter’s 
and Lederer’s views and the theories delivered by Hilferding and Tugan-Baranowsky. 
16 According to Diebolt (2006, p. 4) the deeper roots of Lederer's views could be traced back to Malthus 
(1836) and Sismondi (1827).  
17 De Vecchi (1995, pp.164-165) also commented very briefly on Lederer’s and Schumpeter’s views with 
respect to the concept of ‘rationalization of life’.  
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7. The influence of Rudolf Hilferding and Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-Baranowsky 
7.1 Rudolf Hilferding 
Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941) was born in Vienna into a “Jewish mercantile family” (Sweezy 
1949, p. xv) and died in Paris. He studied medicine at the University of Vienna, where Joseph 
Schumpeter  was  also  a  student,  and  obtained  his  doctorate  in  1901.  However,  he  practiced 
medicine only until 1906 and thereafter devoted himself exclusively to politics and the study of 
economics. At the age of fifteen, he joined the socialist movement and from 1902 he contributed 
frequently  to  Die  Neue  Zeit, the  theoretical  journal  of  the  German Social-Democratic  Party 
(S.P.D.).  Between 1904 and 1923 he published, along with Max Adler,  the  Marx Studien.  In 
1905, Hilferding participated in the Seminar on economic theory directed by Böhm-Bawerk. In 
1906, he accepted an invitation from the S.P.D. and tutored for a year at the party school in 
Berlin,  along with Rosa Luxembourg.  Afterwards,  he  was appointed  to  editor  of  the  party’s 
newspaper,  Vorwärts.  In 1914, Hilferding joined the  Independent  Social  Democratic Party of 
Germany (U.S.P.D.), which emerged from a split with the S.P.D. In 1918, he became member of 
the German Socialisation Commission and in 1922, after the majority faction of the U.S.P.D. had 
been transformed to the German Communist Party (K.P.D.), he returned to the S.P.D. He became 
editor of the party’s journal,  Die Gesellschaft and served as Weimar’s Minister of Finance, in 
1923 and 1928-9. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Hilferding went into exile. He fled to 
Denmark in 1933, then stayed in Switzerland and in 1939 went to Paris. In 1941 he was handed 
over to the Nazis by the Vichy government and died in Paris either by suicide or from injuries 
inflicted by the Gestapo. 
In  his  Finance  Capital  (1910),  the  great  Marxist  theoretician  Rudolf  Hilferding 
introduced the notion of a “latest phase” of capitalism, characterized by: (a) the formation of 
monopolistic  enterprises,  which  put  aside  competition;  (b)  the  fusion  of  bank and  industrial 
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capital leading thus to the formation of finance capital, which was considered to be the ultimate 
form of capital; (c) the subordination of the state to monopolies and finance capital; and finally 
(d) the formation of a protectionist and expansionist policy.
Despite  being  a  prominent  Marxist  thinker,  Hilferding  did  not  attribute  capitalism’s 
doom to the tension between the progressive reduction of socially necessary labor time and the 
fact that labor power constituted the sole source of profit (Darity and Horn 1985). He foresaw a 
transformation of the capitalist economy with growing centralization and concentration of capital 
as  the  normal  outcome  (see  Michaelides  and  Milios,  2005).  For  Hilferding  economic 
development  depended  on  large  non-competitive  enterprises,  the  technological  superiority  of 
which derives from their ability to attain profits high above the average. Just like Schumpeter, 
Hilferding  believed  that:  “Cartelization  brings  exceptionally  large  extra  profits”  (Hilferding 
1910,  p. 233) that  function as incentives for  undertaking such entrepreneurial  acts,  which, in 
turn, will lead to the further empowerment of the non-competitive, monopolistic formations.18
    Hilferding repeatedly affirmed the position that the big corporation is able to create the 
conditions which may assure its market supremacy as well as its extra profits for a long period: 
“An  industrial  enterprise  which  enjoys  technical  and  economic  superiority  can  count  upon 
dominating the market after a successful competitive struggle, can increase its sales, and after 
eliminating its competitors, rake in extra profits over a long period” (ibid, p. 191).
As in Schumpeter’s theory, the most important aspect of growth of corporations is the 
“liberation  of  the  industrial  capitalist  from  the  function  of  industrial  entrepreneur”.  This 
transformation  has  several  consequences.  One  is  the  emergence  of  “promoter’s  profit” 
(Gruendergewinn), which arises from the possibility of selling shares in a joint stock company 
18 According to Hilferding, the elimination of free competition and monopolies came, historically, in a 
similar  way:  “Finance  capital  signifies  the  unification  of  capital.  The  previously  separate  spheres  of 
industrial, commercial and bank capital are brought under the common direction of high finance, in which 
the masters of industry and of the banks are united in a close personal association” and consequently: “The 
basis of this association is the  elimination of free competition among individual capitalists by the large  
monopolistic combines” (ibid, p. 301, emphasis added). Thus, “it is also clear that monopolistic combines 
will control the market” (ibid,, p. 193).  
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for considerably more than the capital invested in the enterprise, if the yield on that capital is 
higher than the current rate of interest on investment. Promoter’s profit  is an incentive to the 
formation of joint stock companies and a source of wealth which becomes available for further 
investment.  In  other  words,  it  stimulates  the  centralisation  of  capital,  the  growth  of  large 
corporations and eventually the formation of cartels and trusts controlling whole industries.19 
On  the  other  hand,  Hilferding  linked  technological  change  to  the  formation  of 
monopolies, which mark a distinct phase in capitalist development and are the main feature of 
economic development.  He considered technical progress to be the condition  sine qua non for 
assuring a cartel’s or a trust’s supremacy in the market: “[O]nce a combination has come into 
existence  as  a  result  of  economic  forces  it  will  very  soon  present  opportunities  for  the 
introduction of technical improvements in the process of production” (Hilferding 1910, p. 197). 
In fact: “They are obliged to introduce these [technical] improvements, for otherwise there is a 
danger that some outsider will use them in a renewed competitive struggle […]. [I]n this case 
technical improvements mean an extra profit, which is not eliminated by competition” (ibid, p. 
233).
It is this technical superiority that makes the monopolistic formations able to maintain 
and constantly reproduce their  dominant  role: “These technical  advantages,  once achieved, in 
turn become powerful motive for forming combinations where purely economic factors would 
not  have  brought  them  about”  (ibid, p.  197).  “The  corporation  can  thus  be  equipped  in  a 
technically  superior  fashion,  and  what  is  just  as  important,  can  maintain  this  technical 
superiority” (ibid, p. 123). 
As far as the hypothesis that perfect competition is an unstable market structure where 
only  large  enterprises  can  push  technological  progress  forward,  Hilferding’s  views  are  very 
interesting.  For  Schumpeter,  once  big  corporations  are  formed,  the  imperfectly  competitive 
19 Hilferding’s analysis treated dividends and promoter’s profit as distinct economic categories, and worked 
out the significance of the separation between ownership and the control  of production, which allows a 
small number of people to acquire control over a large number of companies, and to establish personal 
connections which then facilitate the formation of cartels and trusts. 
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market structure becomes stable, as large firms become increasingly conducive to technological 
progress and change: “There are superior methods available to the monopolist which either are 
not  available  at  all  to  a  crowd  of  competitors  or  are  not  available  to  them  so  readily” 
(Schumpeter  1942,  p. 101).  “The perfectly bureaucratized giant  industrial  unit  […] ousts the 
small  or  medium-sized firm” (ibid,  p.  134).  On the  same line  of  argument,  the large firm is 
considered to possess the ability to attract superior “brains”, to secure a high financial standing 
(ibid, p. 110), and to deploy an array of practices to protect their risk-bearing investments.20  
In his Finance Capital, Hilferding had developed a similar approach: “The expansion of 
the  capitalist  enterprise  which  has  been  converted  into  a  corporation  […] can  now conform 
simply with the demands of technology. The introduction of new machinery, the assimilation of 
related  branches  of  production,  the  exploitation  of  patents,  now  takes  place  […]  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  technical  and  economic  suitability.  […]  Business  opportunities  can  be 
exploited more effectively, more thoroughly, and more quickly […] A corporation […] is able, 
therefore,  to  organize  its  plant  according  to  purely  technical  considerations,  whereas  the 
individual  entrepreneur  is  always  restricted  […]  The  corporation  can  thus  be  equipped  in  a 
technically  superior  fashion,  and  what  is  just  as  important,  can  maintain  this  technical 
superiority. This also means that the corporation can install new technology and labour saving 
processes  before  they come into  general  use,  and  hence  produce  on a  large scale,  and  with 
improved, modern techniques, thus gaining an extra profit,  as compared with the individually 
owned enterprise” (Hilferding 1910, pp. 123-4). Consequently, “The introduction of improved 
20 The thesis regarding the limited ability of free competition to promote technological progress is supposed 
to  be a  conclusion drawn from past  historical  experience.  More precisely,  Schumpeter  argued that  the 
capitalist era could be divided into two distinct periods (Screpanti and Zamagni 1993, p. 243 ff.): (a) The 
era of ‘competitive capitalism’ when small enterprises dominated, an era which declined in the 1880s and 
(b), the era of monopolistic or ‘big-business capitalism’ during which large enterprises, trusts and cartels 
dominated, starting roughly from the 1880s and having consolidated its fully fledged form by the time 
Schumpeter’s  book was written.  In  Schumpeter’s  own words:  “[i]t  is  still  permissible  […] to  call  the 
nineteenth  century  κατ’  εξοχήν the  time  of  competitive,  and  what  has  so  far  followed,  the  time  of 
increasingly ‘trustified’ or otherwise ‘organized’, ‘regulated’, or ‘managed’, capitalism” (Schumpeter 1928, 
p. 363). 
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techniques  […]  [benefits]  the  tightly  organized  cartels  and  trusts.  [T]he  largest  concerns 
introduce the improvements and expand their production” (ibid, p. 233).
Hilferding also emphasized in his analysis the crucial role of “credit money”. However, 
he differentiated between paper money “which emerges from circulation as a social product”, 
and credit money which is a “private affair”, not backed by the government (Hilferding 1910, p. 
66). In this last case, money can be replaced by a promise to pay. The development of capitalism 
is followed by a rapid increase in the total volume of commodities in circulation: “the expansion 
of production,  the conversion of all  obligations into monetary obligations,  and especially the 
growth  of  fictitious  capital,  have  been  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  extent  to  which 
transactions  are  concluded  with  credit  money”.  So,  Hilferding  concluded  that  credit  money 
required “special institutions where obligations can be cancelled out and the residual balances 
settled, and as such institutions develop so is a greater economy achieved” (ibid, p. 66). 
For Hilferding credit originated as a consequence of the changed function of money as a 
means of payment. A purchase not followed by direct payment, i.e. a delay in payment “means 
that one capitalist has enough surplus capital to wait for payment for the purchaser, the money 
due  is  credited”  and  “money  is  […]  merely  transferred”  (ibid, p.  82).  However,  when  a 
promissory note functions as a means of payment, money capital has been saved, and this type of 
credit  is  called  “circulation  credit”  (ibid, p.  83).  According  to  Hilferding,  this  credit  form 
increases  transactions  between capitalists  and  so  an increased  demand for  production  capital 
emerges. 
He  believed  that  an  increase  in  production  means  a  simultaneous  expansion  of 
circulation and “the enlarged circulation process is  made possible through an increase in the 
quantity of credit  money” (ibid, p. 83).  However, circulation credit  does not  “transfer  money 
capital from one productive capitalist  to another” (ibid, p. 87). This role is played by another 
form of  credit,  which  converts  idle  money into  active  money capital,  and  is  called  “capital 
credit”. This credit form constitutes a transfer of money to those who use it as money capital, i.e. 
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for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  the  elements  of  productive  capital.  Conclusively,  credit  “puts 
money into circulation as money capital in order to convert it into productive capital” (ibid, p. 
88). This expands the scale of production with the simultaneous expansion of circulation. Thus, 
the scale of circulation is enlarged by utilization of previously idle money.
Rudolf Hilferding, in his own discussion of economic crises (ibid, ch. 16-17) argued that 
“such  expressions  as  ‘overproduction  of  commodities’  and  ‘underconsumption’  tell  us  very 
little” (ibid, p. 241). He, thus, investigated the specific causes of economic crises and, in particu-
lar, the disproportionality between the capital goods and consumer goods industries which was 
according to him the real cause of instability and crises (see also Milios 1994; Milios et al. 2002, 
ch. 6, 8). More precisely, Hilferding, in a fine Austrian fashion, emphasized the distortions in the 
structure of prices as fundamental to the propagation of capitalist crises. After presenting his dis-
proportionality theory, Hilferding made comments about the changes in the character of crises 
because of the growth of monopolies and cartels.
 He created a theory of economic fluctuations based on the notion of disproportionality 
crises. This disproportionality theory, delivered by Hilferding (1910) in his  Finance Capital, is 
based on a two-sector model with the difference in organic composition of capital between sec-
tors producing a time lag structure in production and capacity expansion. This (asymmetric) time 
lag structure causes, in turn, an (asymmetric) price structure across the various sectors, which 
causes, in the end, a disruption in the proportionality relations required for smooth capital accu-
mulation. Hilferding argued that if changes in prices are uniform then there is no redistribution of 
capital among the various branches and the conditions of smooth capital accumulation are satis-
fied. Crises occur only if the increase in prices has a non-uniform character. 
Hilferding explained how this asymmetric price structure leads to a period of crisis: As 
investment increases and the organic composition of capital increases in the 1st sector, the time it 
takes for installation becomes longer, creating time lags in investment and expansion. The time 
lag in this sector causes supply to adjust to demand with delay, leading to an increase in prices at 
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a faster rate than the 2nd sector and hence to a pressure to invest in these industries. Thus, the in-
crease in the organic composition of capital will, in the long run, lead to a decline in profits. 
However, in the short  run, the asymmetric rise in prices will  lead to asymmetric increases in 
profits between the two sectors. This causes over-investment and accumulation in the sector with 
the higher organic composition of capital, and because production in the other sector (i.e. with 
the lower capital intensity) has not increased proportionally, prices and profits drop and crisis 
sets in.21
Apparently, Lederer’s early description of the business cycle is consistent with Hilferd-
ing’s disproportionality crisis analyzed above. After all, Lederer himself emphatically stressed 
that “even a blind man can see that that [the lack of proportion between producers’ and con-
sumers’ goods production] is characteristic of every cycle” (Lederer 1936, p. 157) and acknowl-
edged the work of the great Marxist thinker: “That the lack of right proportions between the dif-
ferent branches or spheres of production breeds the cycle is the view of the theory on Marxian 
lines, also (f.i. R. Hilferding, R. Luxemburg)” He even went on to admit that: “This and similar 
views were widely discussed […] and shared by theorists who would not subscribe to the revolu-
tionary implications of that theory” (ibid, p. 157).  Also, in his 1925 work, Lederer clearly im-
plied that Schumpeter (among other theoreticians such as Bouniatian) was his initial inspiration: 
“Die Depression [...] wird in der neueren Literatur, so bei Bouniatian und Schumpeter als ein 
statischer Zustand der Volkswirtschaft aufgefasst” (Lederer 1925, p. 361).22
7.2 Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-Baranowsky
Mikhail  Ivanovich  Tugan-Baranowsky  was  born  in  Kharkov,  Ukraine  in  1865.  He  studied 
Natural  Sciences  at  the  Kharkov  University  but  by  1890  his  interests  had  shifted  towards 
21 According to Darity and Horn (1985, p. 364) Hilferding’s attitude towards prices is clear in his last publi-
cation (Hilferding 1963).
22Meanwhile, according to Dielbolt's (2006, p. 4) brief comment Lederer seemed to underestimate Marx's 
respective analysis (Lederer 1925, p. 368). 
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Political Economy and he continued his studies at the Faculty of Law and Economics in the same 
university. In 1889 he married Lydia Karlovna Davydova23 editor of the journal Mir Bozhy (The 
World of God) that was sympathetic towards Marxist views. 
In 1894 Tugan published in Russian his Studies on the Theory and History of Trade Crises  
in England after spending six months in London to gather material. In this work, Tugan expound-
ed a radical critique of the underconsumptionist theory then predominant among Russian (and 
German) Marxists. Following this publication, he was granted a Master’s Degree at the Moscow 
University and he was appointed at the St. Petersburg University in 1895. In 1914 he was elected 
to the chair of Political Economy and Statistics of St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute. Howev-
er, he  could  take  this  chair  only  in  1917  due  to the  government’s non-endorsement of  his 
election24.  After  the Russian Revolution, he moved to Ukraine becoming Minister of Finance 
from August to December 1917 in the short-lived Ukrainian Government. In 1918 he was one of 
the founders of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine in Kiev. During the same year, he 
was appointed dean of the Law Faculty of Kiev University. He died in 1919, by heart  attack 
while traveling by train from Kiev to Paris where he had decided to emigrate.
Tugan-Baranowsky is considered to be one of the most influential Russian economists of 
the pre-revolutionary era. In the words of Schumpeter (1954, p. 1126): “Tugan Baranowsky […] 
was the most eminent Russian economist of that period” and concerning his 1894 book that it 
“did make a mark and did exert influence far and wide”. The questions he raised in relation to the 
link  between the  Marxist  theory  of  reproduction  and  the  theory of  crises  were  of  particular 
importance and remained in the forefront of discussion between Marxists for many years.25  
Tugan-Baranowsky (1894)  formulated a theoretical analysis of economic development 
based on the reproduction schemas of Vol. II of Capital. In this work he gave an extensive theo-
23 Lydia Kralovna Davydova was at the same school with Lenin’s wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia. 
24 According to  Barnett  (2001)  this  was due  to  Tugan’s  activities  as  a  leading member  of  the  ‘Legal 
Marxists’.
25 Acoording  to  Barnett  (2004),  Tugan  –  Baranowsky is  also  regarded  as  a  member  of  the  “Russian 
Historical School”, i.e. the Russian strand of “historical political economy”, in parallel with the more fa-
mous German and Irish examples.
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retically and empirically grounded presentation of his arguments, criticizing the underconsump-
tionist theory, then predominant among Russian (and German) Marxists. There, just like Lederer, 
Tugan-Baranowsky argued that a capitalist society can exist and reproduce itself on an expanding 
scale. 
The only prerequisite, according to Tugan and shared by Lederer for unimpeded expan-
sion of production is that the “right” proportion be maintained between production in the two ba-
sic sectors (production of means of production and production of consumption goods) which are 
described in the reproduction schemes of Vol. II of Capital: “The general view, which to a cer-
tain extent was also shared by Marx, that the poverty of the workers, i.e. of the great majority of 
the population, makes it impossible to realize the products of an ever expanding capitalist pro-
duction, since it causes a decline in demand, is mistaken. […] Capitalist production creates its 
own market – consumption being only one of the moments of capitalist  production” (Tugan-
Baranowsky 1969, p. 33; translated in Luxemburg 1971 pp. 312). In other words, the idea of un-
equal expansion rates between the two sectors of production is common to Tugan–Baranowsky 
and Lederer.   
 Probably the most fundamental difference between Tugan and Lederer is that Tugan-
Baranowsky in his work adopted the absolute immiseration thesis reckoning a gradual deteriora-
tion of the standard of living of the working class (Milios et al. 2002 ; Milios and Sotiropoulos 
2007). On the other hand, Lederer believed that in the capitalist system crises are inseparably 
linked with economic growth26 and that every depression phase results in a higher level of social 
product without some clear trend regarding the relative shares of wages and profits.
Tugan-Baranowsky viewed the concept of technology from a Marxian perspective and 
examined  the  relationship  between  technological  progress  and  the  rate  of  profit.  In  fact,  he 
26 This view is reflected in his regard of the pre-capitalistic foundations of Japanese society: “[in Japan] 
precapitalistic and full capitalistic elements have thus been amalgamated into a single historical whole. The 
precapitalistic foundation, which is feudal in an ideological as well as an economic sense, is on the one hand 
a curb on further capitalistic development and, on the other, a source of security in time of crisis” (Lederer 
and Lederer-Seidler 1938, p. 225).
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subjected to criticism the “law of the falling tendency” of the rate of profit  and attempted to 
substantiate the view that the introduction of technological innovations in every case result in a 
rise  and  in  no  case  a  fall  in  the  rate  of  profit.  The  increase  in  the  rate  of  profit  following 
mechanization of production is brought about by the increase in the productivity of labor and in 
the rate of surplus value, the later being effected by the reduction in the labor-value of variable 
capital (Milios et al. 2002).
According to Colacchio’s analysis (Colacchio 2005), credit and investment play a key 
role in Tugan’s explanation of the business cycle,  too.  In a way practically echoing Lederer, 
Tugan attaches a distinctive economic role to the social groups the income of which does not 
fluctuate during the different phases of the cycle. The savings of this part of the population lead 
to the  accumulation of free  loanable  capital  at  an approximately constant  rate.  However,  the 
demand for free capital (i.e. credit, although not in the sense of additional credit as in Lederer’s 
theory) is discontinuous and there lies the actual cause of business cycles. During a recession 
phase, free capital lies idle in the banks and interest rates fall. This creates favorable conditions 
for investment and a moment is bound to come where a revival will occur, when demand for 
loanable  funds  increases  again.  Investment  in  physical  capital  which  has  been  accumulated 
during the depression phase will have multiplier effects in the total economy. Expansion of the 
economy will  take place,  especially in the capital  goods sector.  The expansionary phase will 
come  to  an  end  when  demand  for  capital  exceeds  supply.  During  the  recession  phase,  the 
conditions for a new boom period will be re-created (see further Colacchio 2005).
Lederer and Tugan share the view that a symptom of the upper-turning point of the cycle 
is that credit contracts (Colacchio 1998, quoted in Besomi 2006). However, the explanation for 
credit contraction varies between the two authors. For Tugan this halt is due to the disproportion 
between  productive  departments  while  Lederer  attributes  it  to  bank policy (and  bank profit) 
matters. 
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Despite the profound similarities in Lederer’s view on the subject, Tugan’s hypothetical 
assumption that savings remain idle in the banks during the recession phase provoked Lederer’s 
criticism. According to Lederer, savings are invested during all phases of the business cycle. For 
Lederer,  additional credit is what matters as far as the business cycle is concerned. Economic 
activity is not financed by the savings of the past (i.e. of the recession phase) as Tugan’s theory 
implies  but  only  from  additional  credit or  new  savings.  However  Lederer’s  view  on  the 
unavoidability of investment of all savings is not explained in a very persuasive manner.
For Tugan-Baranowsky capitalist  crises are the result  of temporary disproportions be-
tween production in the two main sectors of the economic system (the one producing capital 
goods and the other producing consumer goods). “If social production is proportionately orga-
nized, there is no limit to the expansion of the market other than the productive forces available” 
(cited in Luxemburg 1971, p. 313). Thus: “The underconsumption of the popular masses can be 
an obstacle for the realization of the social product only insofar as it hinders a proportional distri-
bution of the social production.  Yet, the lack of proportionality is, also in this instance, the only 
cause of an insufficient demand.  Therefore, one should not consider both, the lack of proportion-
ality and underconsumption, as two particular causes of the crises since, strictly speaking, both 
are one and the same” (Tugan-Baranowsky 2000, p. 86). Tugan-Baranowsky in this way provides 
us with an interesting conception of cyclical fluctuations in capitalism.
Lederer’s  theory  of  the  business  cycle  is  similar  in  many  respects  to  Tugan  Bara-
nowsky’s approach. On the one hand, the idea of unequal expansion rates between the two sec-
tors of production is common to both. Moreover, they both link this process with a redistribution 
of income from the working class to the capitalists. The role of credit is stressed by both theoreti-
cians as an essential element of economic fluctuations. Furthermore, they share similar views in 
some other  less  central  aspects.  They  both  emphasize  on  the  fluctuations  characterizing  the 
prices of products in the heavy industries (raw materials) and consider this phenomenon indica-
tive for the initiation of the various phases of the cycle. Besides, they describe in a very similar 
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manner the transmission mechanisms taking effect when a positive change of prices (in the boom 
period) or otherwise, propagates throughout the economy as a whole.
Lederer differentiated his disproportionality theory from other explanations of the busi-
ness  cycle  that  come under  the  same heading,  especially  that  of  Tugan-Baranowsky,  on  the 
grounds that they explain the differences in the expansion rates between the two main sectors of 
the economy as a result of absence of central planning in the capitalist system with respect to the 
growth process. In contrast, his theory conceptualized the emergence of disproportions as eco-
nomically “correct” and necessary for economic growth. Lederer ascribed the function of eco-
nomic development to the capitalist class and thus the alteration in the income distribution during 
the boom period is a logical consequence of this fact. The disproportionality in the expansion 
rates of the two sectors is a reflection of this income redistribution as it was explained before. 
The re-establishing, to a certain extent, of the previous income shares of the different classes will 
take place in the crisis period when accumulation rate decreases.
Lederer referred to Tugan’s disproportionality theory when discussing policy measures 
for coping with economic crises.  There he drew a parallel  between the proposal for  granting 
credit during the crisis period in order to sustain enterprises which are unable to withstand the 
decrease in profits27 and Tugan’s view of an unimpeded expansion process conditioned only on 
the preservation of the right proportions between the two sectors of the economy. The affinity be-
tween such proposals and Tugan’s expansion process lies in their perception of the possibility of 
“producing for the sake of production”, i.e. that sufficient levels of demand for consumer’s goods 
is not a necessary condition for the expansion of the economic system. Lederer thought that such 
granting of unlimited credit would have inflationary effects, unsustainable by any credit system. 
He regarded Tugan’s vision unrealistic for the reason that accumulation and individual consump-
tion are not independent (see Milios et al. 2002 and Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2007).
27 Another alternative, based on a similar argument, is the granting of credit to the consumers in order to 
restore adequate levels of demand.
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8. Conclusion  
It was the purpose of the present paper to compare Joseph Schumpeter and Emil Lederer, with 
respect to their visions concerning the notions of economic development, technology, credit and 
business cycles. Despite the fact that the two economists are traditionally classified in different 
schools of thought, their theoretical investigations in a great number of thematic areas seem to 
converge to similar views. Moreover, the roots of some of Schumpeter’s and Lederer’s common 
views were traced back to Rudolf Hilferding and Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-Baranowsky. 
For instance, Schumpeter, Lederer and Hilferding used similar arguments to emphasize 
the link between economic development and technological change. In their analyses, Schumpeter 
and Lederer referred to psychological factors motivating the entrepreneur, in order to explain the 
forces that set in motion the process of innovation and thus economic development. The effects 
caused by the introduction of innovation in the labor market and the concept of technological 
unemployment  are  described  in  a  similar  manner  by  both  of  them.  Hilferding  stressed  the 
importance of technology but mostly with respect to market structure and, more specifically, the 
emergence of monopolies and cartels. Both Schumpeter and Lederer regarded the domination of 
the market by monopolies as a motivating force for technological change, due to the possibility 
of extra profits which are not possible under conditions of perfect competition. 
Overall,  there is a common tendency toSchumpeter,  Lederer  and Hilferding to regard 
innovation  as  a  determining  factor  of  the  evolutionary  process  of  the  economic  system. 
Schumpeter’s and Lederer’s visions are very similar with respect to the subjective motives that 
are responsible for the introduction of innovations. They also agree on their disruptive character 
and more specifically on the effects that the introduction of innovation is bound to have on the 
labor market. Schumpeter and Lederer share with Hilferding the view that the market structure 
promoting  technological  change  is  the  one  defined  by the  domination  of  great  monopolistic 
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concerns. Tugan-Baranowsky’s contribution concerning the link between technological progress 
and the increase in the rate of profit was also significant.
The function of credit  is another central theme in the works of the two theoreticians. 
Besides,  they  all  comprehended  in  a  similar  manner  the  way  that  credit  expansion  infuses 
dynamism into the economic system, creating, thus, on the one hand new growth prospects, and 
on the other financial and economic instability. 
Also, regarding the issue of economic crises and fluctuations, Schumpeter and Lederer 
argued that economic fluctuations arise from the disruptions created by innovations, which are 
introduced discontinuously into the economic system, whereas Hilferding focused on the role of 
disproportionality between sectors producing capital goods and those producing consumer goods. 
At this point it is interesting to note that, in his early writings, Lederer had adopted many of 
Hilferding’s theses presented in his disproportionality theory. However, the theory of economic 
crises  and  fluctuations  formulated  by  Tugan-Baranowsky  was  probably  the  precursor  of  all 
disproportionality theories.
Finally, as far as their methodological approaches are concerned, they seem to converge 
significantly, since both economists tended to support their arguments with empirical data and 
exhaustive discussions, exhibiting a strong link of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence.28 
Conclusively, Schumpeter and Lederer have delivered theses which are similar in scope 
and  conclusions.  We  may,  thus  conclude  that  both  theoreticians  developed  certain  of  their 
theories in the same social, political, theoretical and ideological environment and were probably 
well  acquainted  with  each  other’s  ideas.  We may suppose,  therefore,  that  the  similarities  of 
certain  Schumpeterian  elaborations  with  theoretical  theses  and  analyses  delivered  by  Emil 
Lederer  are  not  accidental,  but  the  outcome of this  long interaction between them and other 
leading economists of that period like Rudolf Hilferding and Tugan-Baranowsky.
28However, it should be noted here that according to Lederer's analysis statistical data alone cannot offer a 
sufficient explanation of purely theoretical issues (Lederer 1925, 354n).  
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Apparently, much of this  similarity can be attributed to their  common socioeconomic 
environment and to the common influences by certain theoreticians and schools of thought (e.g. 
Austrian tradition, Austro-Marxist economics, etc), not always acknowledged in the literature. 
Part of the explanation why this similarity in visions has been inadequately acknowledged until 
today is the product of ignorance outside Germany of the approaches on which Schumpeter built 
his treatises, given that German non-Marxian economics was represented, in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, almost entirely by Schumpeter. 
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